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Abstract: In computing science, much attention has been paid to generic methods for sharing data in secure infrastructures. These sorts of
methods and infrastructures are, of course, necessary for sharing healthcare data. The authors are, however, a long way away from being
able to realise the potential of medical and healthcare data to support the sorts of extensive, data-intensive experiments being demanded
by precision and stratiﬁed medicine. A key architectural problem remaining to be solved is how to maintain control of patient data within
the governance of local data jurisdictions, while also allowing these jurisdictions to engage with experiment designs that (because of the
need to scale to large population sizes) may require analyses across several jurisdictions. This study provides a snapshot of architectural
work underway to provide a clear, effective structure of data safe havens within jurisdictions. It then describes how formally speciﬁed experi-
ment designs can be used to enable jurisdictions to work together on experiments that no single jurisdiction could tackle alone. The authors’
current work relates to two jurisdictions (in Scotland and in Italy), but the architecture and methods are general across similar jurisdictions.1 Introduction
A wide variety of tools, methods and architectures are capable of
enriching and analysing medical data. There is also great activity
in European regions to develop carefully managed, large repositor-
ies of medical data derived from regional healthcare authorities and
governed according to the practices of local jurisdictions. These
safe havens are primarily maintained through the public sector
and come into limited contact with researchers outside of jurisdic-
tions. The solution to this problem is not simply to move healthcare
data to a generic ‘data warehouse’ or ‘trusted cloud’; there needs to
be a framework for engagement between havens and researchers,
combined with automated methods for the necessary transfer of
data and provision of services. That framework must respect the
governance rules of local data jurisdictions.
The scale of data resources currently held in local jurisdictions is
very large. For example, in Scotland (population 5.5 million) data
are collected at individual level each time a person has contact
with the health service – from pre-birth through to death.
Computerised information for acute and day case admissions
goes as far back as 1968, with approximately 1.4 million new
records added each year. There are around 90 million community
prescriptions in Scotland every year and over 20 million clinical
images are available across the population going back to 2010.
These administrative data are held on a variety of IT platforms
within secure NHS networks. The availability of unique patient
identiﬁers within Scotland allows individuals’ records to be
linked across time and disease categories. A careful balance has
been struck between ensuring that public beneﬁt is derived from
these national data resources, whilst simultaneously protecting the
privacy of individuals. The local safe havens seek to ensure the con-
tinuation of public trust in the use of health care data via a set of
relatively sophisticated governance processes and procedures.J Eng 2016
doi: 10.1049/joe.2016.0170
This is an openResearch on healthcare data safe havens has recently gained mo-
mentum both from an academic and a public sector or industrial
perspective. This is particularly visible in the UK where political
and social drivers and previously highly criticised initiatives, such
as Care.data [1], have made ﬁnding solutions to key functional
and ethical issues a priority. The Scottish Government, in particular,
considers safe havens to be a crucial element of its health informat-
ics strategy [2] and has the vision to set an international standard for
the safe and secure use of electronic health records for research pur-
poses [3]. It is worth noting that a big proportion of research papers
published in this ﬁeld concern work carried out in Scotland. The
importance of safe havens has also been recognised outside the
UK, with the American Medical Informatics Association highlight-
ing the need to further investigate the use of safe havens as part of
the effort towards creating a learning healthcare system [4]. There
have been increasingly more discussions around governance princi-
ples for such safe havens, linked to initiatives worldwide [5–9]. For
example, Ford et al. describe information governance challenges,
including secure data transportation, record matching, data anon-
ymisation and data access control [10]. Burton et al. give a
focused description of data safe havens in terms of proposed socio-
technical criteria that need to be fulﬁlled, including safety, security,
ethics, accessibility, and reliability [11]. Similarly, Laurie et al.
argue for adaptive governance models, safe and effective data man-
agement, and responsiveness to highly dynamic expectations [12].
Pavis and Morris describe the Scottish model, in which project-
speciﬁc research datasets are made available via safe havens to
approved researchers, who are held accountable for privacy protec-
tion [13]. Safe havens are also discussed as part of efforts towards
linking health and social care data, which require data sharing
between jurisdictions and collaboration between health and social
care teams [14, 15].access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
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Discussions such as the aforementioned ones, which focus on the
key principles and the desired societal effects of data safe havens,
are fairly widespread. However, there is limited correspondence
to a more formal architecture that can lead to a data safe haven im-
plementation that enforces the desired principles while remaining
ﬂexible and adaptive. There is also hardly any discussion around
the automation of experiments within and across jurisdictions.
This paper aims to tackle precisely this gap through the discus-
sion of a logical architecture and experiment automation approach,
which respect the governance regulations of local data jurisdictions.
A hierarchically structured data safe haven is proposed in Section 2,
which enables the clear tracking of data management responsibility.
The process of experimentation as it relates to locally controlled
data is next discussed (Section 3), highlighting the central role of
an experiment speciﬁcation in the data sharing process.
Cross-jurisdiction experiments are examined in Sections 4 and 5,
clarifying the roles of data controllers and third-party data integra-
tors. We continue, in Section 6, with a discussion of experiment
automation, at the heart of which lies a formal experiment speciﬁ-
cation as a data sharing contract. In Section 7, we demonstrate
the applicability of our approach through a case study that involves
an experiment currently undertaken across Scotland and Trentino.
We conclude, in Section 8, with an overview of the beneﬁts of
our approach and a discussion of directions for future work.
2 Data safe havens – purpose and architecture
In our view, the purpose of a data safe haven (within a governing
jurisdiction) is to maximise the beneﬁt that can be derived from
its data to medical science (and, ultimately, to healthcare) through
more effective data-intensive experimentation within a responsibly
regulated environment.
Given this purpose, key principles underlying the architecture for
a data safe haven are
(i) Acceptability: It must be such that a deployed version will meet
privacy, integrity, security and ethical concerns necessary for ap-
proval, but also sufﬁcient to satisfy broader public scrutiny.
(ii) Usability: It must be feasible, where necessary, for research-
ers to develop experiments using familiar methods and work-
ﬂows, subject to governance constraints.
(iii) Sustainability: As far as possible the software used must
have either known support, e.g. from vendors, or a known
active open source community. Where it is appropriate as part
of the architecture to contribute to open source software then
it is necessary to budget for contributing to that community
and be sure there is a sufﬁcient (global) community behind
the open source that it can be anticipated to continue. Where
it is appropriate to lead the development of architecture-speciﬁc
software, this should be developed with the Software
Sustainability Institute’s model of sustainable software.
(iv) Flexibility: The functionality of the application program-
ming interfaces (APIs) offered by the core system to other
software should allow a wide range of future analyses, that
are as yet unpredictable, and should as far as practicable
allow the architecture to accommodate much larger data
volumes than initially encountered.
(v) Diversity: The architecture should be capable of evolving to
support the many varieties of data formats currently in use
and frequently changing. As the need arises, and subject to au-
thorization and scrutiny by safe haven managers, participants in
research should be able to create ways of handling these items.
(vi) Scalability: Although early instances of the architecture will
rely primarily on human trust and associated manual oper-
ation of experiment workﬂow, as the volume of data and ex-
perimental demand increases it should be capable of adapting
to include automation of workﬂow where this is consistent
with other architectural and governance principles.This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
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ted architecture should ensure that potential modes of failure
and misuse will be progressively identiﬁed and enumerated.
As each is identiﬁed, tests for the subsequent releases of the
architecture should be introduced and overseen in a clearly
deﬁned governance structure that includes independent
oversight.
With these principles in mind, we are developing the safe haven
architecture shown in Fig. 1. This shows the principal (conceptual)
elements of data storage and transfer between NHS core systems
and research safe havens. These elements are:
† NHS core systems from which data can be transferred to a ﬁrst
level safe haven only through a gateway system that permits an
approved range of transfer operations (systems of approval, attribu-
tion and responsibility are discussed below).
† Research safe havens are environments within which data is
managed and analysed by authorised researchers. The principal
(ﬁrst level) safe haven contains data originating directly from the
NHS core system (following limited de-identiﬁcation, described
below) and access to it is restricted to researchers/managers approved
to handle data at this (comparatively low) level of de-identiﬁcation.
Subsets of the data available in the ﬁrst stage safe haven can be
made available (via an appropriate, approved, ﬁrst stage gateway) to
a second level safe haven which (depending on the approval needed
for the data concerned) may be accessed by a different group of
researchers/managers. Fig. 1 shows two levels of safe haven but the
sequence of levels can extend further (data obtained from the
second level being used to generate a third level and so on).
† Data gateways provide data transfer from core data to the ﬁrst
level safe haven and between sequences of levels of safe haven.
Each gateway is governed by rules of permitted data transfer
(implemented either through manual control or with various
degrees of automation depending on the purpose of the gateway).
This allows ﬁne-grained control of data supply plus control of
access to data by researchers (depending on the safe haven to
which data is extracted). For example, in Fig. 1, the core data
gateway system is responsible for transfer of data from core NHS
data set to the ﬁrst stage data set and, in practice (because of the
likely scale and diversity of ﬁrst stage data), this gateway is restricted
to highly trusted data managers under control of NHS. Gateway
systems may differ depending on the data sets available in the safe
haven to which each gateway applies and depending on the data
requirements anticipated in the safe haven to which approved data
will be delivered. An example of a gateway system is the Research
Data Management Platform (RDMP), developed in Dundee, to
provide a framework and a suite of tools for the management and cur-
ation of longitudinal research datasets [16]. It not only performs many
typical data extraction, transformation and loading tasks, but also
includes tools for management of the research lifecycle (including
documentation of datasets, cohort linkage and reproducibility of
project extracts). Of course, not all gateway systems need to be this
complex, but the RDMP demonstrates the level of complexity we
expect to ﬁnd in a sophisticated gateway system.
† Data paths are routes through which data can (with appropriate
use of gateways) be obtained in ‘downstream’ data sets from ‘up-
stream’ data sets. In Fig. 1, the second level data set (downstream)
is derived on a data path leading back (via ﬁrst stage gateway) to the
ﬁrst level data set and further back (via the core data gateway) to the
core NHS data.
† Metadata stores are produced by data gateways to record key
properties of the data transferred. Depending on the transfer oper-
ation, metadata may be added in the data haven from which a
gateway has derived data and/or in the haven to which it has con-
tributed data. For example, in Fig. 1 the core data gateway will,
in practice, de-identify data elements through re-naming them,Commons J Eng 2016
doi: 10.1049/joe.2016.0170
Fig. 1 Conceptual model of data safe haven architecturebut (for purposes of attribution) it may store core metadata (private
to NHS core systems) on the relationship between NHS identiﬁers
and synthetic identiﬁers used in data derived for the ﬁrst stage data
set.
† Experiments access (meta)data within the appropriate safe haven
(depicted as Experiments 1 and 2 of Fig. 1). These experiments may
also draw on data from external data repositories and safe havens and
(subject to governance approval) may produce results data for exter-
nal use (e.g. publishing). Experiments may also be run externally to
safe havens for the purpose of acquiring data to enrich other experi-
ments within safe havens (depicted as Experiment 3 of Fig. 1). We
expand on formal deﬁnition of experiments, and the role of these
in cross-jurisdiction data sharing, in Section 3.
The architecture above assumes that different data sets will be
derived, in stages, from core NHS data. These different data sets
will be accessed by different groups of researchers and data man-
agers within a uniform, attributable, auditable system of govern-
ance. The human aspects of this system are arranged in a strictly
hierarchical system as follows:
† Each safe haven has a manager with authority over and respon-
sibility for the operation of that safe haven, the gateways and sub-
havens it contains and any analytics/data-management tools it
contains.
† Gateways between safe havens establish paths of data management
(as described above). For example, Fig. 1 contains a data management
path from a ﬁrst level safe haven to a second level safe haven via a ﬁrst
stage gateway. If there had been a second gateway, at ﬁrst stage,
leading to a different second stage haven then we would have two
data management paths. More generally, data management paths
branch as a tree from the root of the ﬁrst stage.
† The responsibility for data management across a data path is then
the union of data managers for the safe havens along that path. For
the paths in our example of Fig. 1, the responsibilities for the path
leading to the second stage data set is the union of managers for safe
havens at levels 1 and 2.J Eng 2016
doi: 10.1049/joe.2016.0170
This is an openThe core architecture described above is concerned only with the
management of data sets and with controlling responsibility/access
roles related to these. The work of analysing and managing these
data sets is more diverse (and perhaps speciﬁc to particular data
sets). We therefore view these as extensions to the core architecture.
Common forms of extension include:
† Query and analysis systems: provided in order to perform ex-
perimental analyses within appropriate safe havens. Their availabil-
ity may differ between safe havens because it may be necessary to
restrict the analyses available to some groups of researchers (e.g. on
data with particular sensitivities) or it may be that some safe havens
are set up for researchers who bring with them approved tools that
are not available to others (e.g. because of licensing agreements).
† Data translation systems: provided to shift between data
formats.
† Ontology mapping systems: provided to elate data in one
naming system to data in another.
† Data export systems: provided for making data available exter-
nally to the safe haven. This might be through export of appropri-
ately de-identiﬁed analytics results or it might be the generation
of synthetic data, supplied as a way of engaging external computing
scientists with data representative of safe haven data.
The diversity of extensions allowed in any given safe haven will
be determined by the appropriate manager, based on: the roles of
individuals permitted in that haven; the nature of data it contains;
and other governance constraints as appropriate. Within these con-
straints, the aim is to encourage responsible use of a diverse range
of tools as extensions to the architecture.3 Data experiments
In our view of healthcare data safe havens, data sharing is always
understood in the context of experiment speciﬁcations that describe
the speciﬁc analyses that researchers wish to perform on regional
data. Within the experiment, speciﬁcation is a formal contract for
data sharing for the experiment. This is the key to effective governanceaccess article published by the IET under the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
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because it describes precisely, at the level of experiment design, how
all parties expect data to be used across an experiment. Fig. 2 shows
the central role of an experiment speciﬁcation in the data sharing
process. Experiment requirements are described by researchers and
reviewed with the relevant governance specialists, resulting in a
formal experiment speciﬁcation that describes the necessary interac-
tions between data controllers and researchers in order to complete
the experiment. This speciﬁcation contains no patient-speciﬁc data
so can be reviewed/adapted outside data safe havens. It is used
within safe havens by data controllers who (subject to each controller’s
governance and ethics constraints) use their segment of the experiment
speciﬁcation as a deﬁnition of the actions expected of them by the ex-
periment (typically this will involve querying locally controlled data
sets, de-identifying the data and abstracting away detail that might
identify individual people). Under control of data controllers, appropri-
ate results can then be derived as per the experiment speciﬁcation; then
brought outside the local jurisdiction for experiment analysis and val-
idation. Throughout this process, the experiment speciﬁcation acts as
an overall plan for the experiment, giving a form of contract
between the parties involved and providing transparency of process
(external to the data controllers) for review by governance bodies.
As well as providing rigour and transparency, our long term goal
is to be able to maximise automation of the process of data acqui-
sition and analysis across healthcare jurisdictions, while also being
able to verify at every stage that the operations performed on data
are within the safe envelope speciﬁed by the system of governance
applicable to all the data concerned. This requires standardisation of
data schemas, ontologies and metadata (around the group of key
data assets in the safe haven); formal deﬁnition of the processes/
and analytics methods used in data management, along with the se-
curity policies (and accompanying permissions and obligations)
used to ensure governance compliance. These should be deﬁned in-
dependently of the infrastructure used to host the data, so allowing
automation via compatible local (bespoke) servers, trusted cloud
architectures or personal devices.
4 Cross-jurisdiction experiment architecture
Fig. 3 shows the essential components of the architecture for con-
ducting experiments across jurisdictions. Data controllers operate
through data safe havens within their jurisdictions (in the diagram
we have two data controllers, each operating within a different juris-
diction). Each controller has its own control and responsibility for
accessing and integrating data within its jurisdiction. A safe haven in-
tegrator is an entity that is trusted by data controllers to maintain con-
tracts for data sharing between jurisdictions. To facilitate accurate
data sharing, each controller and the safe haven must be able to
align those parts of its data ontology that are relevant to appropriate
data sharing contracts. As we show later, the safe haven integrator
can (with appropriate design of data sharing contracts) be kept strictly
separate from data operations within jurisdictions, which allows a
clear separation of responsibilities in the contract and close control
of data by controllers within an agreed contractual framework.
From an organisational point of view, data controllers and inte-
grators have the following important properties:
Data controller
† Typically, there is one data controller per jurisdiction. For
example, the two jurisdictions relevant to our research are NHS
National Services Scotland (NSS) and the Azienda Provinciale
per i Servizi Sanitari in Trentino (APSS).
† Each controller has a deﬁned legal responsibility for data within
its jurisdiction.
† Each controller holds deﬁned data sets, and associated metadata
with a data safe haven (which typically is a collection of federated data-
bases, as in Scotland, rather than being a single physical storage site).
† Each controller controls both data sets and ontologies for that
data.This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
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traction from sources in their jurisdiction. They are responsible
(subject to governance approval) for enacting each data access
request to interrogate speciﬁed data with a speciﬁed query – thus
producing experimental results.
† In the current operating model, each data query must seek to
query data sets held solely by a single data controller. In Scotland
the model would then be that NSS (the data controller) seeks the
minimum data required to answer the speciﬁed question (for
example a combination of a locally-held dataset and a national
dataset). All required information is placed into a safe haven
within which the experimenter (appropriately authorised) is then
able to undertake analysis. This data integration process requires
the transfer of both data and subsequent experimental results.
† Data controllers can support activities related to the design and
interpretation of experiments. They also, however, support activities
related to the operation of experiments (data extraction, integration
and analysis) and these are core elements of our data sharing con-
tracts (see Section 6.1).
† Data controller functionality via NSS in Scotland is currently
supported by chargeable access to expert facilitation staff. This is
not chargeable access to data or sale of data. The model operates
on a cost recovery basis with opportunities for price variation de-
pendent on customer type.
Data integrator
† A data integrator is an entity trusted by data controllers to main-
tain contracts for data sharing between jurisdictions.
† A key function therefore is to preserve and monitor these data
sharing contracts, which are formal speciﬁcations of the process
of data sharing between controllers.
† Unlike data controllers (which must be on systems controlled by
local data jurisdictions), a data integrator can potentially be hosted
on any system, so it could be operated via one of the data controllers
or by a third party.
† A data integrator does not undertake data extraction (unless it is
also a data controller).
† It enables data integration by coordinating the activities of the ap-
propriate data controllers through reference to the data sharing con-
tract (example of a speciﬁcation language for such contracts is
given in Section 6).
† A further important function of a data integrator is ontology
mapping. When a data integrator completes the creation of a data
sharing contract it is critical to ensure that each query is correctly
interpreted by the data controller with the responsibility to
execute it, so that terminology is used consistently overall. In the
simplest case, we could ensure this sort of consistency by involving
the relevant data controllers in the design of the data contract, ensur-
ing that the ontologies of controllers precisely match that of the con-
tract. In practice, however, data controllers will have differing
ontologies for the data sets in their jurisdiction so it will be neces-
sary to deﬁne mapping rules that relate terminology in contracts to
ontologies in jurisdictions. We return to this issue in the context of
our data sharing contracts in Section 6.2.
† A ﬁnal important data integrator function relates to veriﬁcation
and attribution in data sharing contracts. A key beneﬁt of the
formal data sharing contracts described in Section 6 is that they
can be used to retain a precise, high-level record of the interaction
between (and to an appropriate level within) data controllers. In
Section 6.4, we discuss this in more detail.5 The role of third parties, external to data controllers
The data transaction examples deﬁned in this paper could be com-
pleted, in their simplest form, between a data controller and an ex-
perimenter. As experimental or query complexity increases,Commons J Eng 2016
doi: 10.1049/joe.2016.0170
Fig. 2 Overview of the process of experimentation as it relates to locally controlled dataadditional roles/role-holders may need to be added, for example
additional data controllers, the use of a third-party data integrator
and so on. In such cases, two broad categories of activity can be
assigned to an external third-party:
† Experimenter support: for example data query design or results
analysis and interpretation (annotation, statistics, graphical presen-
tation etc.).
† Activities within a safe haven: through provision of tools that
support, enable or accelerate processes owned by the safe haven
and associated data controller.
Both can be effectively underpinned with the ‘software as a
service’ business model the basis for which is a periodic or ad
hoc subscription model. Chargeable access might be based upon;
† Infrastructure costs for the computational footprint required
(compute and/or storage).Fig. 3 Sharing data across jurisdictions
J Eng 2016
doi: 10.1049/joe.2016.0170
This is an open† Application licensing for the analytics/software tools provided.
† System integration (depending on data ﬂows to be supported and
resources to be made available).
† A managed service wrapper (service desk function, ﬁrst/second/
third line support teams, potentially consultancy/development for
new integrations).
† Bespoke elements included (and potentially charged as consult-
ancy work) by the responsible party.
Multiparty solutions are also possible, with several external third-
parties collaborating to deliver complex, integrated service provision
– for example with subscription pricing based on cost recovery for
the elements above by each partner. One vehicle for this might be
contracting or service level agreements via a single frontend
service provider, with ‘back-to-back’ contracts/service level agree-
ments (SLAs) to the partners involved in service delivery.
In our view, the purpose of a data safe haven (within a governing
jurisdiction) is to maximise the beneﬁt that can be derived from its
data to medical science (and, ultimately, to healthcare) through
more effective data-intensive experimentation within a responsibly
regulated environment.
6 Formal experiment speciﬁcations as data sharing contracts
A data sharing contract is a formal speciﬁcation of the process of
data sharing between controllers. It is speciﬁed in sufﬁcient detail
that it, potentially, can be used as a script for automating the
process of data sharing (so it is an executable speciﬁcation). Its prin-
cipal function, however, is to describe precisely how data is shared
for a given purpose. An example of a data sharing contract
described in the Lightweight Coordination Calculus (LCC)
[17, 18] process language is given in Fig. 4. In the example, we
deﬁne what each participant in the data sharing activity is
allowed to do – we refer to this as the role of the participant. The
deﬁnition of each role is in terms of the communications sent to
other participants (in their roles), with M⇒a(R, X) being a
message sent to participant X in role R and M⇐a(R, X) being a
message coming in from participant X in role R. When a commu-
nication depends on the participant performing some operation on
data we attach a description of this operation using the ‘←’access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
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symbol, so for instance M⇒a(R, X)←Op means that message M is
sent to participant X in role R if data operation Op is performed.
In generic process languages, like LCC, we can describe many
different data sharing contracts, but we supply one example in
this document for illustrative purposes (see Fig. 4). Our example
has three roles: an experimenter (coordinating the experiment)
and two data controller roles (controllers 1 and 2). Note that the
controller roles must be undertaken within the local jurisdictions,
but the coordinating experimenter role could be undertaken on
any system prepared to be the integrator:
† The experimenter coordinates the experiment by asking control-
ler 1 to extract the results for query Q1; then asking controller 2 to
extract the results for query Q2; then receiving from each of these
the locations (L1 and L2) of the data ﬁles where the results of
each query can be found; then asking controller 1 to combine
data from locations L1 and L2 (this is the point at which results
are shared between controllers, since L2 is not in controller 1’s jur-
isdiction); then ﬁnally receiving a report of the results, R, from ana-
lysis of the combined data.
† Controller 1 receives a request to extract the results for query Q1;
then (if it is willing and able to enact Q1 on the data in its jurisdic-
tion) sends the location, L1, of the results ﬁle; then it receives a
request to combine data from locations L1 and L2; then sends
report, R, of the analysis (if it is willing and able to perform the
analysis).
† Controller 2 receives a request to extract the results for query Q2;
then (if it is willing and able to enact Q2 on the data in its jurisdic-
tion) sends the location, L2, of the results ﬁle (Fig. 4).
The speciﬁcation provided in Fig. 4 is executable and enacting it
on an appropriate infrastructure generates a sequence of communi-
cations between the experimenter and controllers 1 and 2. Each of
the role deﬁnitions deﬁnes what is expected of the corresponding
participant, so each participant’s contract for data sharing is separ-
able and clearly deﬁned. In the example, the data operations take
place only in the two data controller roles (controllers 1 and 2),
with the experimenter only sending and receiving communications
to/from the controllers. This has two important consequences: that
the experimenter never accesses data in controller’s jurisdictions (it
only receives a report of the results of analyses) and that it makes no
technical difference where the experimenter role is physically coor-
dinated (it could be coordinated on either of the controllers or
independently).
6.1 Operations available within jurisdictions
The operations available to data controllers within jurisdictions are
of four broad types:
† Data extraction operations: reach into data sets and pull out
(smaller) data sets according to query deﬁnitions.Fig. 4 Example of a data sharing contract described in the LCC language
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative
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(larger) data sets.
† Data analysis operations: apply data analytics algorithms to
data sets to produce (new) results inferred from the original data.
† Data abstraction operations: transform data sets according to
anonymisation requirements.
In our previous example, enact_query(Q, L) is a data extraction
operation, while analyse_data(L1, L2) is a data analysis operation.
In the most basic form of safe haven integration we need not have
a standard language for data operations (assuming that standardisa-
tion of operations can be done through agreement between the data
controllers who wish to share data) but the ideal, to which we
should strive, is for there to be a standard repertoire of data opera-
tions that is maintained through agreement between controllers,
thus making it straightforward to execute a data sharing contract
once it is approved.
The three-role data analysis scenario (involving an experimenter
and two controllers) described above can then be constructed from
the four basic operations as follows:
(i) Controller 1 receives a query from the experimenter:Com(a) controller 1 executes the corresponding data extraction
operation,
(b) controller 1 runs a data abstraction operation over the
extracted data (for the purposes of anonymisation with
respect to the laws of its jurisdiction),
(c) controller 1 indicates the location of the resulting dataset 1
to the experimenter.(ii) The same operations for controller 2 returning dataset 2.
(iii) Controller 1 receives from the experimenter a request for ana-
lysis of a data set combined from dataset 1 and dataset 2:(a) controller 1 executes the corresponding data integration
operation,
(b) controller 1 runs a data abstraction operation over the com-
bined data set in order to make sure no reconstitution of per-
sonal data is possible from the combined data set,
(c) controller 1 executes the data analysis operation,
(d) controller 1 sends back the result of analysis to the
experimenter.6.2 Ontologies and ontology mapping
The ﬁnal element of standardisation in our architecture (beyond the
contract language and data operations) is the ontology used to
express data queries and related domain-speciﬁc terminology. In
our example, this would be necessary, in practice, to ensure that
query Q1 could be interpreted correctly on the data sets accessible
to controller 1 and (similarly) that query Q2 could be interpreted by
controller 2. In the simplest case, we could ensure this sort ofmons J Eng 2016
doi: 10.1049/joe.2016.0170
consistency in terminology by involving the relevant data control-
lers in the design of the data contract, ensuring that the ontologies
of controllers precisely match that of the contract. In practice,
however, data controllers will have differing ontologies for the
data sets in their jurisdiction so it will be necessary to deﬁne
mapping rules that relate terminology in contracts to ontologies in
jurisdictions. For example, query Q1 in our contract might be
‘sex = male & age > 16’ but because it is in Italy controller 1
might need to translate this into the query ‘sesso = maschile &
anni > 16’. This can be done via the mappings (sex = sesso),
(male = maschile) and (age = anni).
Data controllers will use a multi-layered architecture for their ontol-
ogies where language-speciﬁc terminology, language-independent
(conceptual) domain knowledge, and data structures are represented
as separate layers. Such an architecture decouples the problem of
multilingualism (as shown in the example above), from that of the
alignment of domain knowledge and of data structures, allowing for
easier portability of knowledge to new languages.
To improve interoperability across data controllers, besides
ontology mapping a partial pre-alignment of ontologies will be
made possible. This pre-alignment is consensus-based, i.e. it is
only attempted to the extent where an agreement among peers
can be reached with reasonable effort. The resulting shared ontol-
ogy will be hosted by the Safe Haven and made accessible to all
parties. Ontology mapping will only need to be applied to knowl-
edge not shared in this manner.6.3 Data integration
Search, combination, or analysis of data sets requires some level of
understanding of their underlying meaning. Such meaning is forma-
lised with respect to reference knowledge held by data controllers.
Data integration refers both to the process of discovery of meaning
within a data set and to its alignment to reference knowledge.
We perform data integration in an entity-centric manner where
data records are ultimately aggregated around entity instances and
are stored in the data controller’s entity base. Integrated entities
can subsequently be queried, searched, combined, and be subjected
to data analysis operations in a consistent manner.
Generally, entity-centric data integration is a semi-automated
process consisting of a series of alignment steps:
(i) terminology alignment between the terms used in the data set
and the vocabulary layer of the reference knowledge;
(ii) schema alignment between the structure of the data set and
the corresponding reference data structure (i.e. entity type);Fig. 5 Example of a data sharing contract instance between two data controllers
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This is an open(iii) data alignment to clean data values and to bring them to a
form coherent with the aligned schema;
(iv) entity alignment to convert data records into entities and es-
tablish relations among entities;
(v) metadata alignment to deﬁne provenance, terms of use,
privacy policies for the entities created.
6.4 Veriﬁcation and attribution in data contracts
Since our data contracts are designed to contain the key details of
the interaction needed between jurisdictions in order to share
data, it is straightforward to record instances of completed contracts.
These instances can then be used as evidence of appropriate data
sharing, for veriﬁcation and auditing purposes, and for attributing
data to jurisdictions.
For example, the experiment contract used as our running
example might have been used with two data controllers (‘trento’
and ‘scot’) and a safe haven called ‘haven’ to extract males over
16 from trento and females over 16 from scot; then combine
these data for analysis at trento. The resulting contract instance,
documenting the data transactions, is given in Fig. 5 (where loc1,
loc2 and loc3 are locations for data).
6.5 Security policies in contracts
Extraction operations performed on data within jurisdictions are
always performed by the appropriate data controllers, giving them
familiar control over this fundamental aspect of data sharing. In
our running example, this means (for instance) that the decision
on whether or not enact_query(sex = female & age > 16, L2) is ac-
tually done is under the control of controller 2, which is managing
those data, and controller 2 could choose not to enact the query if it
felt that security/privacy rights might be compromised. It would
also be possible, in data sharing circumstances where more subtle
forms of assurance are needed, to build these into the formal data
sharing contract. For example, we might want to have a variant of
our contract for controller 1 (in the example in Fig. 4) where it
does not simply analyse the data taken from its own jurisdiction
(L1) in combination with that from controller 2’s jurisdiction (L2)
and send the results (R) immediately to the experimenter but,
instead, gives controller 2 the opportunity to check R and conﬁrm
that it is happy with these data before they are communicated to
the experimenter. The contract for this would be as shown in Fig. 6.
6.6 Security in infrastructure
The data contracts and ontology mappings described above can be
speciﬁed independently of the infrastructure used to share data.and a safe haven
access article published by the IET under the Creative Commons
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Fig. 6 Example of a security policy in a contractIndeed, in the simplest case (where all steps in the contract are per-
formed manually) there need not be a means of enacting contracts
on computing infrastructure (and the data contract is just a more
precise form of a conventional experiment description). However,
a key feature of our executable speciﬁcations is that they can be
used to automate sharing, given appropriate infrastructure and ap-
propriate interpretation machinery for the formal speciﬁcations.
This raises requirements for the infrastructure used in automation:
† When data located at one jurisdiction will be used in analysis at
another jurisdiction (as in analyse_data(L1, L2, R) in the example
above) we need to be sure that only Data controllers authorized
to see the relevant data sets can actually access those data.
† The contracts themselves (if used automatically to control
sharing) must be held in such a way that they cannot be maliciously
adapted (for instance, to change the contract so as to send data to a
third party).
† The design of contracts must be such that data with strong secur-
ity restrictions is not ‘leaked’ into areas where weaker security is
assumed. This safeguard is maintained in conventional data
sharing by manual inspection of experiment design but our
formal speciﬁcations could support (limited forms of) automatic
veriﬁcation of these sorts of properties.7 Experiment case study
In Section 2, we described the concept of a hierarchically structured
data safe haven. Then, in Sections 3 and 4, we explained how for-
mally deﬁned experiment designs could form contracts that enable
experiments across safe havens to be automated. To give the reader
an indication of the complexity of experiment designs in this
context, we include in this section a practical experiment that we
are undertaking between jurisdictions in Scotland and Trentino.
The purpose of the study is two-fold:
(i) To determine the absolute risks of mortality and serious vascu-
lar events among those treated with non-vitamin K oral antic-
oagulants following a spontaneous intracranial haemorrhage.Fig. 7 Experimenter protocol in the case study
This is an open access article published by the IET under the Creative
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8(ii) To compare the mortality and serious vascular event risks in
those treated with non-vitamin K oral anticoagulants versus
warfarin, following an intracranial haemorrhage.
Patients who have experienced an intracranial haemorrhage will
be identiﬁed from hospital admissions. Linkage to community pre-
scription data will identify those patients who were administered
non-vitamin K oral anticoagulants (Rivaroxaban, Dabigatran,
Apixaban) or Warfarin during the 90 days after hospital discharge.
Subsequent mortality and vascular events (ischemic stroke, system-
ic embolism, intracranial haemorrhage, extracranial haemorrhage)
will be identiﬁed through linkage to national mortality records
(which provide date and underlying cause of death) and hospital ad-
mission data.
Other covariates to be adjusted for in the analyses include: a
measure of deprivation (income-based socioeconomic status assess-
ment), age, sex, comorbidity (determined based on the co-occurring
conditions which impacted treatment as recorded in the hospital dis-
charge record and hospital admissions in the 5 years prior to the
intracranial haemorrhage).
The feasibility of this cross-jurisdiction study therefore depends
on the availability and capacity to link together, at individual
patient level three key national health administrative datasets in
each of Italy and Scotland:
† Hospital admission data – including the ICD10 diagnostic codes
and OPCS4 procedural codes.
† Mortality records – including ICD-10 coded cause of death.
† Community prescription/dispensing data – including the dosage
and frequency of medications prescribed.
In addition, these data must be available for a sufﬁciently long
period in order to determine outcomes occurring during at least
one year follow-up following drug administration. To maximise
the number of cases of intracranial haemorrhage in whom treatment
with non-vitamin K oral anticoagulants or warfarin post-discharge
was commenced, there is no restriction on the dates to be
included. Identiﬁcation of intracranial cases should commenceCommons J Eng 2016
doi: 10.1049/joe.2016.0170
Fig. 8 Protocol for the Scotland/Trento controllers in the case study
Fig. 9 The population query in the case study
Fig. 10 The context query in the case studyfrom the date at which non-vitamin K oral anticoagulants were ﬁrst
introduced.
Given the experimental setting above, we divide the data sharing
contract for this experiment into three protocols: for the experiment-
er (interacting with Scotland and Trento jurisdictions), for the
Scottish jurisdiction and for the Trento jurisdiction.
Experimenter protocol: This is provided in Fig. 7 and it gives the
same three query requests to Scotland and to Trento (a query to de-
termine the population for the study; a query to provide contextual
information on each individual in the population; and a query to de-
termine the subset of the population that experienced subsequent
mortality). The locations of data produced by each query (not yet
the data themselves) are relayed to the experimenter by Scotland/Fig. 11 The mortality query in the case study
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This is an openTrento. Then the experimenter requests access to the Scotland
and Trento data sets and acquires the data from the appropriate loca-
tions once access is granted.
Scotland/Trento protocols: The same protocol is followed by each
of these two controllers, as shown in Fig. 8. Each of the three queries
supplied by the experimenter (Q1, Q2 and Q3) is enacted and the data
stored at appropriate locations (L1, L2 and L3). Then (once requested
by the experimenter) access is allowed to the data at L1, L2 and L3. A
ﬁnal message from the experimenter ﬂags that the data has indeed
been acquired to the experimenter’s satisfaction.
Population query: This query constructs (in the variable Ps) the set
of data ﬁelds (P, Ta) such that P has been admitted to some hospital,
H, on some event, E, involving an intracranial haemorrhage at aaccess article published by the IET under the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/)
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time Th, with an anticoagulant, A, being administered at time Ta
which is no more than 90 days after Th (Fig. 9).
Context query: This query constructs the set of data ﬁelds (P, D, A,
S, Cs) such that the ﬁeld (P, Ta) appears in the data set, Ps, extracted
by our earlier population query and we can ﬁnd: the deprivation
status, D, of the locale, L, in which P resides; the age, A, of P;
the sex, S, of P and the set, Cs, of comorbidities, C, occurring for
P at a time, Tc, within 5 years previous to Ta (Fig. 10).
Mortality query: This query constructs the set of data ﬁelds (P, D)
such that the ﬁeld (P, Ta) appears in the data set, Ps, extracted by
our earlier population query and we can ﬁnd the cause of death,
D, for P if P was admitted to some hospital, H, with ischemic
stroke, systemic embolism, intracranial haemorrhage or extracranial
haemorrhage at some time, Th, later than the patient’s time of ad-
mission, Ta, in our earlier population query (Fig. 11).
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a logical architecture and a formal ap-
proach to specifying experiments within and across healthcare data
safe havens, which respect the governance rules of local data jurisdic-
tions. In particular, the safe haven architecture proposed allows dif-
ferent data sets to be derived, in stages, from core NHS data, while
establishing clear paths of data management and associated responsi-
bility. As far as experiment speciﬁcation is concerned, we argue for a
formal contract for data sharing, which acts as an overall plan for the
experiment, clarifying the roles and tasks of different parties. Such a
formal experiment speciﬁcation provides transparency for review by
governance bodies and it allows the automation of the data sharing
process, which is currently fully manual. It also enables cross-
jurisdiction experiments, in which data controllers and third-party
data integrators work together, while maintaining clearly separated
responsibilities that are consistent with governance principles.
The speciﬁcation methods described in this paper are not new –
they are familiar from earlier work by ourselves and others on the
use of formal protocol languages for knowledge sharing. There
remains, however, much more development work in order to
derive full beneﬁt from the style of formal representation we have
described. We have shown that we can describe the data sharing com-
ponent of individual experiments and that this can be used to provide
ﬁne tuning of data sharing (crucially, in the context of the formally
expressed experiment design) between appropriately structured juris-
dictions. Only a portion of the experiment is currently automated –
currently, we only use full automation for the data queries; not for
the execution of the protocol. Technically, we could fully automate
all our experiment protocols (LCC is an executable speciﬁcation lan-
guage) but to do so requires further work on the infrastructures neces-
sary to build appropriate auditing, security and trust into the system.
Working with the jurisdictions concerned, we are developing these
infrastructures in a manner that takes into consideration both existing,
local cultures of data curation and the emerging international culture
of responsible data sharing in healthcare.
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